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Abstract. Ad exchanges are widely used in platforms for online dis-
play advertising. Autonomous agents operating in these exchanges must
learn policies for interacting profitably with a diverse, continually chang-
ing, but unknown market. We consider this problem from the perspec-
tive of a publisher, strategically interacting with an advertiser through
a posted price mechanism. The learning problem for this agent is made
difficult by the fact that information is censored , i.e., the publisher knows
if an impression is sold but no other quantitative information. We ad-
dress this problem using the Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination
(HBA) algorithm [1,3], which conceptualises this interaction in terms
of a Stochastic Bayesian Game and arrives at optimal actions by best
responding with respect to probabilistic beliefs maintained over a candi-
date set of opponent behaviour profiles. We adapt and apply HBA to the
censored information setting of ad exchanges. Also, addressing the case
of stochastic opponents, we devise a strategy based on a Kaplan-Meier
estimator for opponent modelling. We evaluate the proposed method us-
ing simulations wherein we show that HBA-KM achieves substantially
better competitive ratio and lower variance of return than baselines, in-
cluding a Q-learning agent and a UCB-based online learning agent, and
comparable to the offline optimal algorithm.
Keywords: Ad Exchanges · Stochastic Game · Censored Observations
· Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination · Kaplan-Meier Estimator
1 Introduction
Real-time ad exchanges (AdX) have become a common marketplace for online
display advertising. These automated transactions take place numerous times a
day, when a user visits a web page whose advertising inventory is managed by an
AdX. The webpage, which is essentially the publisher, communicates a reserve
price to the ad exchange for the impression, which consists of a description of the
webpage, of the user and some other relevant content. The ad exchange offers
the impression to the bidding agents, or advertisers, who compete for it in a
second price auction with reserve price, managed by the AdX.
? This work was partially supported from the Greek State Scholarship Foundation by
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These automated transactions play an important role in the economics of
the web, which has meant that advertisers routinely use automated methods to
target these impressions to user profiles and characteristics that they are shown.
The corresponding situation for publishers appears to be different. As argued in a
report from Google [10], who run one such large exchange, publishers are lagging
behind in being able to automate the setting of auction parameters such as
reserve price. Furthermore, a nontrivial fraction of ad exchange auctions involve
a single advertiser [5]. When only one advertiser is involved, the ad exchange
auction mechanism becomes a posted price auction between the publisher and
the advertiser.
In this work, we model this interaction and propose the application of novel
learning algorithms to address the problem of adapting behaviour within the
interaction. We examine the continuous interaction, over a number of rounds,
between the advertiser and the publisher through the posted price auction mech-
anism. There are two key attributes associated with this posted price mechanism;
(a) since there are only two agents involved, the observations the publisher makes
from the advertiser’s bids are doubly censored (i.e., the publisher only learns if a
bid is successful and does not gain further quantitative knowledge of the adver-
tiser’s utilities) and (b) the publisher is facing an adaptive player with a number
of possible strategies at his disposal.
Conceptually, the problem faced by the publisher is that of interacting in an
ad hoc manner, with limited prior knowledge of the opponent. Learning in such
situations is made difficult by the fact that the open ended nature of the hy-
pothesis space results in unacceptable complexity of learning. We propose that
this problem may be addressed by drawing on recent developments in machine
learning, which allow tractable learning despite the incompleteness of models.
In particular, we use the Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA) algo-
rithm [1,3], which conceptualises the interaction in terms of a space of ‘types’
(or opponent policies), over which the procedure maintains beliefs and uses the
beliefs to guide optimal action selection. The attraction of this algorithm is that
it can be shown to be optimal even when the hypothesised type space is not
exactly correct but only approximates the possible behaviours of the opponent.
In this paper, we adapt HBA to the situation where observations are censored,
and demonstrate its usefulness in the AdX domain. In addition, addressing the
case when opponents are playing essentially randomly (a situation where HBA’s
belief update process would be inadequate), we propose the use of a Kaplan-
Meier estimator to approximate the opponent’s stochastic behaviour to choose
actions based on that estimate.
We model the interactions between the two agents as a Stochastic Bayesian
Game Γ of censored observations. The publisher’s goal is to maximise his ex-
pected revenue over the T rounds of the game. In order to do so he needs to infer
the bidding strategy of the advertiser. We define a space of behaviours for the
advertiser, including various distributions and adaptive procedures, such as Q-
learning and learn-then-bid strategies [12]. So, a publisher using HBA maintains
a belief about the advertiser’s behaviour, defined as a probability distribution
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over this space of types, ΘA, and plays best response to it. It is worth noting that
the offline optimal algorithm for the publisher, that serves as an upper bound
on the expected revenue of our method, is the strategy that has prior knowledge
of the buyer’s strategy (something that is unrealistic in practice, but illustrative
for algorithm analysis) and plays optimally against it from the first turn of the
game.
There is a substantial body of work in the AdX literature, which focuses on
finding a publisher’s reserve price policy to optimise his revenue in second price
auctions with reserve price [8,15]. However, these works, which mainly focus
on the theory, often restrict attention to situations such as where an advertiser
is only an unknown random distribution (hence, not adaptive), and where the
publisher has access to uncensored samples. From a practitioner’s perspective,
it is interesting to ask if we can go beyond some of these assumptions and devise
learning algorithms for the publisher that only uses the censored observations
available online (hence making it robust with respect to model mismatch), and
allow for more generality in the behaviour of the advertiser, specifically allowing
that agent to adapt (which is very realistic in the scenarios we mentioned earlier).
In our experiments, we show that the proposed procedure is able to adapt better
than baselines such as Q-learning or a UCB-based online learning procedure,
and that it approaches the offline optimal benchmark in many situations. In
order to understand the behaviour of this algorithm under model mismatch, we
also present experiments with an adaptive adversary which is a neural network,
looking both at the transient behaviour of HBA when the adversary is actively
learning and is non-stationary, and also the case where the adversary is a mixture
that is different from any individual element in the type space over which HBA
maintains beliefs.
2 Related Work
Much has been written about ad display and sponsored search auctions, for each
participating agent of the auction, either as publisher or advertiser. A key paper
in the area of ad exchanges is that of Muthukrishnan [16], who laid out several
research directions in this domain, informed by exposure to the practice in this
domain.
More specific related work, viewing the problem from the perspective of the
publisher, are the following. Mohri and Medina [15] discuss selecting the reserve
price to optimise revenue in a second price auction with reserve price. They
consider a supervised learning setting and assume access to a training sample
of uncensored historical data. A similar formulation of revenue is seen in the
work of Cesa-Bianchi et al. [8], where the authors assume no historical data,
but they get direct observations based on the assumption that every bidder in
this market draws his valuation from the same fixed and unknown distribution
D. Then they proceed by showing a regret minimisation algorithm, achieving
sublinear regret. In other recent work, Amin et al. [5] define the notion of the
strategic regret and present no-regret algorithms with respect to that notion. Fi-
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nally, Huang et al. [13] study the problem of setting a price for a potential buyer
with a valuation drawn from an unknown distribution D and prove tight sam-
ple complexity bounds for regular distributions, bounded-support distributions,
and a wide class of irregular distributions. This work is preceded by Cole and
Roughgarden [9], who also analyse sample complexity of revenue maximisation,
this time as a function of the number of bidders in an auction.
From the advertiser’s perspective, Amin et al. [4] study budget optimisation
for sponsored search auctions. The authors cast the problem of budget opti-
misation as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with censored observations and
propose a learning algorithm based on Kaplan-Meier estimators. The authors
also perform a large scale empirical demonstration on auction data from Mi-
crosoft, in order to demonstrate that their algorithm is extremely effective in
practice. Another take on the advertiser’s optimisation problem is the one by
Ghosh et al. [12] who study the design of a bidding agent in a marketplace for
displaying ads. They provide algorithms and performance guarantees for both
settings, while also experimentally evaluating their performance on a fitted log-
normal distribution from data observed from the Right Media Exchange.
Another literature that is closely relevant pertains to learning to interact
in multiagent domains, with limited or no prior coordination. Related work in-
cludes [1,7,19]. A key concept arising from this literature is that of modelling
the opponent in terms of a hypothesis space of policies, that in a certain sense
approximate the space from which that agent herself chooses the true policy.
3 Model for the Publisher in an Ad Exchange
We start by presenting our model of how we conceptualise this interaction
with the (model of an) advertiser, agent A, as a Stochastic Bayesian Game.
The advertiser is characterised by a discrete state space S, defined by his own
budget BA and the auction round t, s
t = {BtA, t}. He has a set of actions
AA = {0, . . . , vmax} which are the possible prices he can bid for an impression
(his valuation vector) and his strategy is chosen from a well-defined type space
ΘA. A payoff function uA : S × A × Θ 7→ R maps his state, type and actions
to specific payoff and a strategy piA : H ×AA × ΘA 7→ [0, 1] defines a probabil-
ity vector over his possible actions. The history vector H contains all histories
Ht = 〈s0, a0, s1, a1, . . . , st−1, at−1, st〉.
We realise the interaction between the advertiser and the publisher as a
Stochastic Bayesian Game Γ of censored information between two players. The
game Γ consists of:
– An advertiser A and a publisher P
– State space S, action space A = {AA,AP }, type space Θ = {ΘA, ΘP }
– Transition function T : S ×A× S 7→ [0, 1]
– Γ starts at time t = 0 and state s0. At each time step t ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . :
1. An impression it arrives
2. The advertiser chooses his action (bid) bt = aA ∈ AA with probability
piA(H
t, atA, θ
t
A)
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3. The publisher chooses his action (reserve price) rt = aP ∈ AP with
probability piP (H
t, atP , θ
t
P )
4. The game transitions into state st+1 ∈ S with probability T (st, at, st+1)
5. If bt ≥ rt the impression is sold at price rt; otherwise the impression
doesn’t get sold
6. The immediate payoff of the advertiser A is utA = b
t − rt
7. The immediate payoff of the publisher P is utP = r
t
– The process is repeated until a terminal state st is reached
In this problem setting, the publisher does not have knowledge of the adver-
tiser’s individual strategy θA ∈ ΘA, only of his type space ΘA which is the set of
all of his possible strategies. He needs to infer that strategy θA from the censored
observations he makes at each auction round in order to play his best response
strategy against it. As mentioned earlier, we utilise the Harsanyi-Bellman Ad
Hoc Coordination Algorithm [1,3]. HBA, and adapt it to the setting of AdX.
The main steps of this procedure are as described in algorithm 1. A key adap-
tation from the formulation in [1,3] is the incorporation of an estimate of the
opponent’s actions and to allow for the KM estimator (to be explained in more
detail in the next section) for the case of a randomised adversary.
We make the following assumptions for our setting:
Assumption 1 We control the publisher P and choose his strategy piP . P has
a single type θP known to us.
Assumption 2 Given a stochastic game Γ we assume all the elements of Γ ,
except of the type θA of the opponent, is common knowledge.
Assumption 3 We only have partial observability of states and actions.
In the HBA algorithm, which maintains a posterior probability of an agent
being a specific type based on observing the history of actions, the action is
selected by determining a best response, within the game Γ , which implicitly uses
in the value calculations Q-values based on the Bellman optimality principle.
The posterior probability of an agent being a specific type is calculated with
the use of sum posterior, defined in [2] as:
L(Ht) =
t−1∑
τ=0
pij(H
τ , atj , θj)
By the term censored observations we refer to the type of the information
perceived by the publisher. As is the case in posted price auctions, the publisher
only gets to observe the outcome of any round t of a sequential auction, which
is if he sold the impression or not, but he doesn’t get to observe the bid that
actually won; he only knows that this bid is greater or equal than the reserve
price he specified (bt ≥ rt). Otherwise, he knows that this bid was strictly less
than his reserve price (bt < rt).
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Algorithm 1 HBA Censored
Input: SBG Γ , player P , user defined type spaces Θ∗A, history H
t, discount factor
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
Output: Action probabilities piP (H
t, r)
1: for all θ∗A ∈ Θ∗A do
2: Compute Pr(θ∗A|Ht) = L(H
t|θ∗A)P (θ∗A)∑
θˆ∗
A
∈Θ∗
A
L(Ht|θˆ∗
A
)P (θˆ∗
A
)
3: end for
4: for all r ∈ v do
5: Compute expected payoff Erst(H
t) as follows:
Ers (Hˆ)←
∑
θ∗
A
∈Θ∗
A
Pr(θ∗A|Ht)
∑
b∈v
Qrs(Hˆ)piA(Hˆ, b, θ
∗
A)
Qrs(Hˆ)←
∑
s′∈S
T (s, r, s′)
[
u(s, r) + γmax
r′
Er
′
s′ (〈Hˆ, r, s′〉)
]
6: end for
7: if arg maxθA∈ΘA ∈ ΘRandomA then
8: piP (H
t, r∗) = 1, where r∗ = Random KM(k, l, kc)
9: else
10: Distribute piP (H
t, ·) uniformly over arg maxr Erst(Ht)
11: end if
3.1 HBA Types (Advertiser’s Strategies)
In this section, we define the hypothesised type space ΘA of the advertiser. The
first two strategies don’t involve an adaptive component, so they are in a sense
naive. However, there are works [17] that suggest that this kind of bidding can
often be found in real world auctions. The rest of the strategies of the advertiser
that we specify, are well studied learning models that involve distinct learning
and strategy components. This set is chosen to capture the diversity of potential
types of behaviour of the unknown adversary.
We also present the best response strategies of the publisher to each of the
respective strategies of the advertiser, under the assumption that all the private
information of the advertiser is known by the publisher. These best response
strategies consist a set of offline optimal benchmarks, that will serve as an upper
bound on the revenue of our method, which assumes no private knowledge other
than the type space of the advertiser.
Greedy Strategy Advertiser’s greedy policy, given his action spaceAA = {0, . . . , vmax},
is to always to bid his maximum value for the impression.
pigreedyA (aA = vmax) = 1
One can see that publisher’s best response policy is to simply match his maxi-
mum value and offer it as a reserve price in every turn of the game.
pi∗P (aP = vmax|pigreedyA (aA ∈ AA)) = 1
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Random Strategy In the second strategy, the advertiser places a bid i.i.d. from
a fixed distribution over his value vector. We use several random distributions,
such as the uniform, the normal, the logistic, the log-normal and the exponential.
The best response strategy against a random advertiser, with the distribu-
tion D over v known by the publisher, is the reserve price that maximises the
publisher’s expected revenue.
pi∗P (aP = r
∗|pirandomA (b ∼D v)) = 1, r∗ = arg max
r∈v rTD(r)
where TD(r) denotes the tail probability of the distribution D for the value r.
Learn Then Bid Strategy The next adaptive bidding strategy of the advertiser
is given in the work of Ghosh et al. [12], where the advertiser chooses to opt out
for a specified number of m out of n rounds in order to observe the prices of the
reserve and then, based on his observations, decides between the price P ∗m that
guarantees, in expectation, the target fraction f of impressions he sets, and the
price Z∗m satisfying the maximum amount he wants to spend.
The best response strategy against an advertiser playing Learn Then Bid
strategy, with the parameters of the Learn Then Bid algorithm known by the
publisher, is the following.
1. Find the maximum value of the price that satisfies the target of his campaign
reach, times the probability of him playing that price.
P ∗m = arg maxPm
fn
(n−m)Pm(Pm)
2. Find the maximum value of the price that satisfies the advertiser’s target
spent.
Z∗m = sup {z : Pm(z) ≥
fn
n−m}
Pm(x) is the estimated distribution of the market from the advertiser af-
ter the learning phase. The optimal policy for the publisher is to exhaust the
advertiser’s budget, by deterministically selecting the maximum of those two
prices.
pi∗P (aP = max {P ∗m, Z∗m}|piLearn Then BidA (aA ∈ AA)) = 1
Multi Armed Bandits Strategy Another strategy we use for the advertiser is
the well known UCB algorithm [6]. We implement it using a -greedy action
selection policy. Publisher’s optimal policy is to offer the maximum value, as a
reserve price in every turn of the game.
pi∗P (aP = vmax, ·|piUCBA (aA ∈ AA)) = 1
It is not hard to see that any traditional no-regret strategy is easily manipu-
lable, therefore inadequate for this interactive problem setting, something also
highlighted in [5].
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Q-learning Strategy The last algorithm in the type space of the advertiser is
the well known Q-learning algorithm [20]. We implement it using a soft-max
action selection policy. The states for the advertiser are the different levels of his
remaining budget and the action space is defined by his value vector.
Publisher’s optimal policy, similar to when he faces a random distribution,
is finding the reserve price that maximises his expected revenue w.r.t. the Boltz-
mann distribution produced by the Q-values, which dictates the soft-max action
selection.
pi∗P (r
∗|piQ-learningA (s, r ∈ AA)) = 1
where,
r∗ = arg max
r∈AP
r
vmax∑
r′=r
eQ(s,r
′)/τ∑
a′A∈AA e
Q(s,a′A)/τ
3.2 HBA Beliefs and Best Responses
Over the recently introduced types, HBA maintains and updates beliefs, that will
determine action selection at each step. In step 2 of Algorithm 1, HBA keeps a
posterior belief over types, Pr(θ∗A|Ht) by keeping track of the sequence of actions
of the opposing player and calculating the probability that these actions come
from a specific type. Afterwards, in step 5, it computes the Q-values of every
possible action at this state Qrs(Hˆ) and, following this, it calculates the expected
revenue Ers (Hˆ) of every action based on the posterior over types it maintains and
on the Q-values it has just computed. In the final step 7, depending on whether
it recognises a stochastic opponent, θA ∈ ΘRandomA , or a deterministic one, HBA
decides between calling a procedure designed specifically for random opponents
(discussed in Section 3.4) and playing a single price as a best response.
By exchanging between iterations of these two procedures, the posterior belief
calculation and the Q-values computation followed by a single expectation max-
imisation step, HBA succeeds in modelling in a dynamic fashion the opposing
agent, while also plays optimally, in expectation, against her at each step.
3.3 HBA Censored
As mentioned earlier, accommodating censored observations requires estimating
actions that can be used for belief updating. There are two specific values that
are needed for such an estimate. The first one concerns the probability of the last
observed action, conditional to a player being of a specific type. This probability
is used to calculate the posterior of the opposing agent’s type, according to the
Bayes rule. In our setting, where the observations are censored, we estimate
this value by using structural characteristics of the distribution he plays. For
instance, let Q be the distribution associated with the Q-values for a Q-Learning
advertiser. If the publisher sells the impression at price r, he doesn’t observe the
bid, but he can update the probability, conditional on his opponent’s type:
Pr(at−1A |θQ-learningA ) = TQ(r)
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The second one concerns the computation of the HBA’s own Q-values in the
expectation maximisation step. Recall from Algorithm 1 that we compute the
Q-values by computing every possible outcome in expectation,
Qvs(Hˆ)← Qvs(Hˆ) + α[v + γmax
r′
Qv
′
s′ (Hˆ)−Qvs(Hˆ)],
where v denotes the utility of the previous step:
v =

v, if v ≤ r and the impression was sold,
0, if v ≥ r and the impression was not sold,
vTQ(v), otherwise.
Again here we utilise the tail probability of the distribution in order to estimate
the required Q-values from the censored observations.
With this, we achieve performance close to the offline optimal metric, against
advertising strategies that play a single price or that are converging to a price,
i.e. Greedy, Learn Then Bid or UCB.
From the defined type space ΘA we see cases where the output of our oppo-
nent’s algorithm is randomised, either according to a fixed random distribution
or a dynamic one, in the case of the Q-learning algorithm. It is known from the
theory underpinning HBA [2] that this case requires different treatment.
3.4 KM Estimator for Stochastic Opponents
We now present an approach based on the Kaplan-Meier estimator [14], for
estimating distributions from censored samples. When HBA recognises a ran-
domised opponent, we let this algorithm decide both the query values and the
optimal reserve price. KM estimator is a powerful tool for approximating dis-
tributions based on censored samples and has found use in both e-commerce [4]
and financial applications [11].
The Random KM algorithm uses a few simple ideas from random sampling
and the Kaplan-Meier estimator. We start by scanning the support of the dis-
tribution for potential candidate values and for every candidate we query for a
sufficient number of times, in order to have a good estimation.
Essentially the Random KM algorithm works in two steps. In the first step,
it queries for k steps over all the support of the opponent’s possible values
and makes a loose estimation of each value’s tail probability by calculating the
fraction of right censored observations (Rt(x), times the impression gets sold
and the value x ≤ r is less or equal than the reserve price), to the sum of right
and left censored observations.
In the second step it isolates the candidate values which are the most probable
to generate the most revenue, and queries each of them for a number of kc steps,
which Kaplan-Meier dictates, in order to get a precise approximation of their
tail probabilities. Using the estimated tail probabilities, it calculates the price
that maximises the expected payoff and returns it.
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Algorithm 2 Random Querying - KM
Input: Distribution q to make CDF queries
Output: Optimal reserve price r∗q
1: procedure Random KM(k, l, kc)
2: for t = 1, . . . , k do
3: Set the reserve price rt uniformly at random.
4: if bt ≥ rt then
5: ∀x such that x ≤ rt : Rt(x)← Rt(x) + 1
6: else
7: ∀x such that x ≥ rt : Lt(x)← Lt(x) + 1
8: end if
9: end for
10: ∀x ∈ support : Tˆq(x) = R
k(x)
Rk(x)+Lk(x)
11: Compute r∗q = arg maxr∈support rTˆq(r)
12: Create the list candidates = [r∗q − l, . . . , r∗q + l]
13: for all c ∈ candidates do
14: Set the reserve price rt = c for kc steps.
15: Keep counter Rtc =
∑t
τ=1 1{bτ≥rτ}
16: Update:
Tˆq(c) =
Rkcc
Rkcc + L
kc
c
17: end for
18: r∗q = arg maxr∈candidates rTˆq(r)
19: end procedure
In Figure 1 we can see how these two steps are implemented in practice. The
green area denotes the estimation of the revenue function, denoted by the blue
area, during the first step (random querying). Similarly, the red area denotes the
approximation of the expected revenue after implementing the KM estimator on
the second step, for a selected number of candidate values. The precise approx-
imation KM provides us, allows for optimal, in expectation, action selection
against stochastic opponents.
(a) Uniform (b) Normal (c) Exponential (d) Log-normal
Fig. 1: Random KM estimation of the empirical payoff functions of various ran-
dom distributions. The loose estimation is the random querying step (in green),
followed by the precise KM step (in red).
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4 Experimental Results
4.1 Agents in the type space ΘA
The AdX domain is of significant commercial importance. However, this also
means that obtaining real world data from live auctions is difficult. We conduct
empirical studies using a domain that captures many aspects of this domain.
The domain is that of the Trading Agents Competition (TAC) AdX ’15 [18],
which simulate an Ad Exchange game. We use our own implementation of these
specifications. In particular we have a setting of 60 days, with 1000 impression
opportunities each day, specified daily Budget B and Campaign Reach CR for
the advertiser and defined advertiser’s type space: ΘA = [Random, Greedy, LTB,
UCB, Q-learn]
We use three basic benchmarks for the evaluation of our HBA-KM algorithm.
1. The Offline Optimal algorithm that knows the true type θA of the advertiser
a priori and decides the optimal policy pi∗P as his best response.
2. The Q-learning algorithm, a well known reinforcement learning technique.
3. The UCB algorithm, a MAB technique.
The Offline Optimal algorithm realises the best response strategies, discussed
in Section 3.1, and serves as an upper bound for our method. We also choose
a Q-learning agent and a UCB-based online learning agent as our baselines,
since, given the stochastic game formulation of the problem, one may hope to
solve it using techniques from reinforcement learning. Q-learning with soft-max,
and UCB with -greedy action selection, are two of the simplest algorithms for
reinforcement learning, giving good results in a wide spectrum of applications.
We use different parameters for each of the strategies in the advertiser’s type
space. For the comparative evaluation of our algorithm, against the specified
benchmarks, we consider metrics, such as the revenue of our algorithm and the
standard deviation to quantify our agent’s payoff variation between consecutive
games.
The parameter settings for our experiments were chosen for the opposing
agents, in a way to demonstrate that our results hold, for every way one could
distribute the probability mass over the value vector for the impressions (v =
[0, 1]), according to a specific random distribution or an adaptive strategy. The
exact parameters that were used for all the simulations follow.
1. For the randomised strategies: U{a, b} for the uniform distribution, with
a = 0 and b = {0.5, . . . , 1}. N (µ, σ2) for the normal distribution, with µ =
{0.25, . . . , 0.65} and σ2 = {2× 10−6, . . . , 6× 10−6}. lnN (µ, σ2) for the log-
normal distribution, with µ = {−7, . . . ,−5.4} and σ = {0.5, . . . , 1}. f(x;β)
for the exponential distribution, with β = {1/900, . . . , 1/500}.
2. For the deterministic and adaptive strategies: For the Greedy strategy, we
set the bid to be vmax = {0.5, . . . , 1}. For the Learn-Then-Bid strategy,
we set the exploration length to be m = {20, . . . , 200} and the target frac-
tion f = {0.3, . . . , 0.7}. For the UCB strategy, we set the exploration step
12 Stavros Gerakaris and Subramanian Ramamoorthy
k = {20, . . . , 200} and the exploitation with probability 1 − , where  =
{0.01, . . . , 0.30}. For the Q-learn strategy we set the learning rate to be
α = {0.1, . . . , 0.3}, the discount factor γ = {0.80, . . . , 0.99} and the temper-
ature of the soft-max selection policy τ = {100, . . . , 1000}
For every opposing strategy, we consider the cartesian product of the param-
eters we specified and the results that follow are averaged over every possible
run using these parameters, across 100 simulations for each individual opponent.
In Figure 2, we can see the HBA-KM’s performance against the deterministic
and adaptive strategies of the advertiser. The performance is close to the offline
optimal benchmark and outperforms the other two baselines.
(a) Greedy strategy (b) Learn Then Bid strategy
(c) UCB strategy (d) Q-learn strategy
Fig. 2: Revenue comparison and one standard deviation against the adaptive
strategies.
In Figure 3, we can see the HBA-KM’s performance against the randomised
strategies of the advertiser. The performance of HBA-KM approximates the
optimal offline benchmark, on every single occasion based on the distribution
approximation that the subroutine Random KM performs.
As another metric we consider the average competitive ratio of each algo-
rithm, when compared to the online optimal one. The online optimal algorithm
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(a) Uniform distribution (b) Normal distribution
(c) Log-normal distribution (d) Exponential distribution
Fig. 3: Revenue comparison and standard deviation against random strategies.
is the one with the best case cost; imagine that the publisher knows a priori
the sequence of bids the advertiser is going to play. Then he attains the online
optimal policy by greedily selecting to sell the impression at the highest possible
cost, up until the budget of the advertiser is exhausted. So for a bid b and budget
B, we have:
piP (b, B) = max
r∈{0,1}
r s.t. r ≤ b, r ≤ B
The competitive ratio is defined as ρAlg1 =
Alg1
Online-Opt and Table 1 sum-
marises the results over all the opposing strategies, adaptive and randomised
respectively. The significant drop on the competitive ratio of every benchmark
we witness when we move from facing adaptive strategies to randomised is ex-
pected, as the optimal online algorithm has knowledge of the exact sequence of
bids, something powerful against truly random opponents.
4.2 Neural Network agent
So far our experiments only included opposing agents that are in the hypoth-
esised type space ΘA of our own algorithm. Unfortunately, this is not always
the case in real life scenarios, as an agent in this marketplace should be able
to face opposing strategies he cannot expect, or model explicitly, in real time.
This is the question we sought to answer in the second part of our experiments;
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Table 1: Average Competitive Ratio, across all strategies and simulations
Against Adaptive Against Randomised
Algorithm Name Competitive Ratio Std Competitive Ratio Std
Offline-Opt 0.9721 0.0064 0.7657 0.1009
HBA-KM 0.9245 0.2073 0.7434 0.1585
Q-Learn 0.7976 0.1650 0.6165 0.2673
UCB 0.7004 0.2334 0.6218 0.1751
what happens when such an agent enters the market and is our algorithm still
competitive against him?
We choose a Neural Network agent as our unknown opponent for two reasons.
The first reason is that a NN does not belong to the hypothesised type space ΘA
of our own agent, therefore our type space should be descriptive enough to be
able to model adequately such unknown agents on the fly. The second reason,
consistent to the second part of our experiments, where we use a Neural Network
trained in a mixture of the opposing publishers, is that we want to capture the
inherent heterogeneity an agent faces in this market, where his opponents are
trained against a variety of pricing algorithms. Here we simulate the Neural
Network with up to 4 Hidden Layers and train it at each arriving impression.
Our exact parameters for the simulation follow: Two input layers, the bid of
the advertiser and the reserve price of the publisher. 1 up to 4 Hidden Layers.
One output layer, the bidder’s immediate payoff. Each node is fully-connected
with nodes of next layer and we use a standard sigmoidal threshold function.
We train online for every instance of the first day of simulations and for 100
impressions for each subsequent day. The network is trained until convergence
at the end of each simulation day. The optimisation step is using a Hill Climber
approach.
NN trained on a single opposing agent In the first set of experiments,
we train the neural network using samples from his current opponent. The two
input layers of the network are the bid and the reserve price for each impres-
sion that arrives and the single output is the revenue of the advertiser. We run
the simulations using a neural network with 1 up to 4 hidden layers. Table 2
summarises the competitive ratio of each algorithm against this agent.
Table 2: Average Competitive Ratio against a NN agent, across all simulations
Algorithm Name Competitive Ratio Std
HBA-KM 0.9423 0.2697
Q-Learn 0.8699 0.3470
UCB 0.8469 0.4119
NN trained on a mixture of opposing agents In the second set of ex-
periments, we train the neural network in a mixture of the opposing publishing
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agents. Specifically, for subsequent chunks of 100 impressions, the NN agent
is trained with samples from the HBA-KM, the UCB and the Q-Learn re-
spectively, throughout the first day of the simulations (1000 impressions). The
reasoning behind this type of training is that in real world auctions we should
expect to face algorithms trained in a variety of scenarios and, as such, we will
not be able to model these agents explicitly. Table 3 shows that against this op-
posing network, our algorithm stays highly competitive, even compared to the
online optimal benchmark through the competitive ratio.
Table 3: Average Competitive Ratio against a mixed Neural Network agent,
across all simulations
Algorithm Name Competitive Ratio Std
HBA-KM 0.9501 0.2222
Q-Learn 0.7957 0.4336
UCB 0.8630 0.3897
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we address the learning problem faced by the publisher in an
ad exchange, an interaction that is both practically significant and scientifically
challenging. We propose the use of a novel methodology for learning in multia-
gent interactions, showing how this enables us to achieve substantial empirical
improvements in simulations involving the TAC AdX domain.
Although we have not performed the theoretical analysis of these extensions,
we conjecture that HBA-KM best response actions will always converge to an ap-
proximately optimal policy against either stochastic or deterministic opponents,
within this posted price auction mechanism. This is based on the observation
that the challenge is twofold, with each individual piece having known properties.
The Random KM estimator can approximate successfully any given distribution,
or a specific family of random distributions, while HBA converges to the correct
beliefs over his hypothesised type space ΘA.
A useful future direction would be to expand this to the case where there
are multiple advertisers and a publisher interacting with each other in the ad
exchange market. The main question here becomes whether there is a way (a) to
model explicitly every single one of your opponents, or (b) to model the market
price, i.e. the price ρt that an agent A ∈ A faces in each step t of the auction and
is derived from the joint actions of every other agent in the auction A−{A}. An
algorithm that answers successfully either of those questions, would come a long
way to us understanding the implicit interactions between different agent types,
and will probably have other implications in situations where the modelling of
your opponent, or teammate, on the fly is the core of the problem, such as the
ad hoc teams challenge [19].
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